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COMMUNITARIAN FUNCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Public trial by jury is established by the Sixth Amendment as a
right of the criminally accused. Although not articulated in the Con-
stitution or accorded constitutional status by decisional law, the
courts have also recognized, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implic-
itly, a public interest in trial by jury in criminal cases that is distinct
from the public's interest in a fair trial for the. accused or the reliable
determination of guilt and innocence. This separate public interest
derives from what can be called the criminal jury's "communitarian"
function. The communitarian function of public trial by jury in crimi-
nal cases can be divided into three related aspects: 1) a democratic
vehicle for community participation in government in general and the
criminal justice system in particular; 2) a means by which the commu-
nity is educated regarding our system of justice; and 3) a ritual by
which the faith of the community in the administration of justice is
maintained.
In most circumstances, the communitarian function of the jury is
consistent with the interests of the accused. The right to public jury
trial itself and the procedures associated with it are primarily protec-
tions for the accused that at the same time serve to foster community
participation, education, and faith in the administration of justice. In
some circumstances, however, the communitarian function of the
criminal jury may be at odds or appear to be at odds with the rights of
the accused. In those instances, one interest must prevail or the con-
flicting interests must be balanced and accommodated.
This Article examines Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding
three circumstances in which the communitarian function of trial by
jury is apparently inconsistent with the rights of the accused: 1)
where the accused wishes to waive her right to trial by jury and be
tried by the court; 2) where the accused wishes to exercise peremptory
challenges to eliminate a cognizable group of jurors that she believes
will tend to be unsympathetic to her defense; and 3) where the accused
opposes television coverage of her trial contrary to the rules or ruling
of the court. In each of these circumstances the accused may be con-
fronted with the prospect of majoritarian bias that, while extremely
difficult if not impossible to demonstrate, poses a genuine threat to
her fair trial rights. The Supreme Court, when confronted with these
circumstances, has implicitly balanced the communitarian function of
the jury trial against the rights of the accused, without explicitly ac-
knowledging the conflict. The Court has instead engaged in fictions to
obscure the fact that the interests of the accused and those of the com-
munity diverge.
This Article argues, first of all, that the communitarian function of
public trial by jury in criminal cases is an important aspect of the ad-
ministration of justice in our democratic society. As such, it should be
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explicitly acknowledged as a matter of constitutional doctrine, as well
as public policy. Secondly, this Article argues that, despite the jury
trial's important communitarian function, there should be a presump-
tion in favor of the interests of the accused whenever there is a conflict
in an area of Sixth Amendment protection. That presumption should
be overcome only where the government can demonstrate that there is
no genuine threat of bias against the accused. This conclusion has
three foundations: 1) the Sixth Amendment's specific establishment of
public trial by jury as a protection for the accused; 2) the problem of
majoritarian bias and the role of the judiciary in protecting the ac-
cused against such bias; and 3) the compromising of the communitar-
ian function itself that results whenever it is asserted to burden the
rights of the accused.
II. THE COMMUNITARIAN FUNCTION OF THE CRIMINAL
JURY TRIAL
The Constitution provides, in two separate places, for trial by jury
in criminal prosecutions. Article III, Section 2 provides that: "The
trial of all crimes except in cases of impeachment shall be by jury...."
The Sixth Amendment also provides for trial by jury in criminal prose-
cutions, but does so specifically as a right of the accused: "In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed." Despite the separate provision of Article
III, Section 2, which on its face suggests a broader public interest in
trial by jury in criminal cases, the Constitution has been generally
interpreted by the Supreme Court to provide for trial by jury solely as
a protection for the accused, and not for any separate purpose.
In Patton v. United States,' the Court directly faced the issue of
whether the Constitution intended to establish the jury as a necessary
part of the criminal justice process, or only to guarantee the accused
the right to trial by jury. The Court concluded that Article III, Section
2 must be read together with the Sixth Amendment, not as jurisdic-
tional, but as "confer[ring] a right upon the accused which he may
forego at his election."2
In Duncan v. Louisiana,3 which held that trial by jury in criminal
cases is fundamental to the scheme of American justice and therefore
mandated in state courts by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
traced the right to trial by jury in criminal cases from the Magna
Carta and through the eighteenth century, in which Blackstone re-
1. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
2. Id. at 298. In reaching this conclusion, the Court in Patton relied heavily on a
1908 First Circuit opinion that it quoted at great length, Dickinson v. United
States, 159 F. 801 (1st Cir. 1908).
3. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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ferred to it as a "'wisely placed... barrier... between the liberties of
the people and the prerogative of the crown.'-4 The right to trial by
jury is, according to Duncan, "'granted to criminal defendants in order
to prevent oppression by the Government.' "5
In reconstructing the constitutional foundation of trial by jury in
criminal cases, Duncan made no reference to a public interest sepa-
rate from the protection of the accused. Although Duncan referred to
the virtue of "community participation" in the administration of jus-
tice, it did so only as the means by which the accused is protected from
the unchecked power of government. The Court explicitly stated:
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him
an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred
the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less
sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the
jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a funda-
mental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust
plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group
ofjudges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Gov-
ernments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insis-
tence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or
innocence. 6
Thus, the Court in Duncan viewed any communitarian function of
trial by jury to be merely a vehicle for the accused's protection.
Nonetheless, the Court has at times articulated (and at other times
implicitly asserted) a public interest in criminal trial by jury distinct
from protection of the accused and from fair and reliable determina-
tion of guilt. This interest focuses not on the accused or the rights of
individuals, but on the welfare and efficacy of the community at large.
It derives from the perceived contribution of criminal trial by jury to
social cohesiveness in a democratic society-from what can be called
the criminal jury's "communitarian function."7
This communitarian function, as occasionally articulated by the
courts, has various interrelated aspects. These can be grouped in
three primary categories: 1) a vehicle for direct community participa-
tion in the criminal justice system; 2) a means by which the commu-
nity is educated regarding the criminal justice system; and 3) a ritual
4. Id. at 151.
5. Id. at 155.
6. Id. at 156.
7. The term "communitarian" has been applied loosely to a range of political and
legal viewpoints and philosophies. See generally Harold Berman, Individualistic
and Communitarian Theories of Justice: An Historical Approach, 21 U.C. DAVIs
L. REv. 549 (1988); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics and the Claims of Com-
munity, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 685 (1992)(examining the various sources and strands
of "communitarian" philosophy and debate); Philip Selznick, The Idea of a Com-
munitarian Morality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 445 (1987). As used here, "communitarian"
means simply that which pertains to the welfare of the community as a whole.
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by which the faith of the community in the administration of justice is
maintained.
Probably the fullest exposition of the communitarian function of
the criminal jury trial is found in Powers v. Ohio,8 in which the Court
held that a criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of
jurors through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant
and the excluded jurors share the same race. Justice Kennedy's opin-
ion for the Court began by citing Duncan for the proposition that
"[tihe opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the adminis-
tration of justice has long been recognized as one of the principal justi-
fications for retaining the jury system."9 The Court in Powers relied
for that proposition on Duncan in part, despite the fact that, as noted
above, Duncan's only reference to community participation is as a pro-
tection for the accused.
Powers next quoted the following language from Balzac v. Porto
Rico:1o
The jury system postulates a conscious duty of participation in the machinery
of justice .... One of its greatest benefits is in the security it gives the people
that they, as jurors, actual or possible, being part of the judicial system of the
country, can prevent its arbitrary use or abuse.
This language evokes both the participatory and the ritual aspects of
the communitarian function.11
The Court in Powers also quoted at length from Alexis de Toc-
queville's Democracy in America,12 which evoked the educational as
well as the participatory and ritual aspects of the communitarian
function in language that clearly separates the public interest in the
jury system from the interest of the accused:
"[Tihe institution of the jury raises the people itself, or at least a class of citi-
zens, to the bench of judicial authority [and] invests the people, or that class of
citizens, with the direction of society.
*. The jury... invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes them
all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge towards society; and the
part which they take in the Government. By obliging men to turn their atten-
tion to affairs which are not exclusively their own, it rubs off that individual
egotism which is the rust of society.
* * * * *€
I do not know whether the jury is useful to those who are in litigation; but I
am certain it is highly beneficial to those who decide the litigation; and I look
8. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
9. Id. at 406.
10. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
11. Id. at 310. Balzac itself, far from a landmark decision in the protection of the
right to trial by jury, held that the right of the accused to trial by jury did not
extend to Puerto Rico in its territorial status.
12. ALEx DE TOcQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY iN AMERICA (Schocken 1st ed. 1961).
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upon it as one of the most efficacious means for the education of the people
which society can employ."13
Justice Kennedy concluded that jury service, which "preserves the
democratic element of the law," is, "with the exception of voting, for
most citizens,... their most significant opportunity to participate in
the democratic process.' "14
While never accorded explicit constitutional status by the courts,
the communitarian function of the criminal jury trial is fundamental
to our system of justice. The values of participation, education and
ritual affirmation that it promotes are each crucial in a democratic
society for public acceptance of the administration of criminal justice
in particular and the exercise of governmental authority in general.
One explanation of the mechanism by which society benefits from
the participatory and ritual aspects of the communitarian function
was articulated in United States v. Lewis:15 "Jury trials have histori-
cally served to vent community pressures and passions. As the lid of a
tea kettle releases steam, jury trials in criminal cases allow peaceful
expression of community outrage at arbitrary government or vicious
criminal acts."'16 Viewed in this way, the communitarian value of trial
by jury results from its ability to induce a societal catharsis.
This cathartic value can only be realized, however, where the com-
munity perceives that it has truly participated in the administration
of justice. What can happen when a segment of the community per-
ceives itself as excluded from participation in the criminal justice pro-
cess and loses faith in that process was vividly demonstrated by the
civil unrest following the acquittal of white Los Angeles policemen ac-
cused of illegally beating black motorist Rodney King. As a result of a
change of venue, the defendant policemen in that case were tried by
an all-white jury in a different community than that in which the al-
leged crime occurred.17 The King case, and other similar cases,18
13. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,407 (1991)(quoting DE TOCQUEVmLE, supra note 12,
at 334-37).14. Id.
15. 638 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
16. Id. at 580. In Lewis, the court upheld on First Amendment free exercise grounds
the right of a defendant religiously opposed to trial by jury to waive his right to a
jury without the government's consent.
17. See, e.g., Lou Cannon, Beating Case Goes to Jury This Week; LA_ Police Pitted
Against Each Other With Videotape as Star Witness, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1992,
at A3.
18. As noted in Andrews v. State, 438 So. 2d 480, 482 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983)(Ferguson, J., specially concurring), vacated, 459 So. 2d 1018 (1984):
The practice of excluding blacks from juries was listed in the Governor's
Report on the 1980 Miami Riot as a reason why blacks in Dade County
distrust the Criminal Jury System. The practice was specifically identi-
fied as a cause of the 1980 so-called 2McDuffie Riots' which followed ac-
quittal of white officers who beat to death a local black insurance
executive.
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demonstrate just how tenuous is the social contract by which the com-
munity accepts and supports the criminal justice system, and they un-
derscore the significance of community participation in, education
about, and ritual affirmation of that system.
Recognition of its communitarian function gives substance to the
concept of a public interest in trial by jury. That interest is consistent
with the fact that the Constitution provides, in Article III, Section 2,
without qualification and without reference to the protection of the
accused, for trial by jury in all criminal cases. Inherent in the commu-
nitarian function, however, is a potential for conflict with the interests
of the accused protected by the Sixth Amendment and the ideal of im-
partial justice. This is particularly true where the defendant is the
victim of majoritarian bias. This Article explores that potential for
conflict and how the Supreme Court has dealt with it in three specific
contexts.
HI. WAIVER OF THE JURY BY THE ACCUSED
A. The Conflict Between an Accused's Legitimate Interest in
Waiver and the Jury's Communitarian Function
The right to trial by jury in a criminal prosecution means that the
accused cannot be convicted so long as one of twelve ordinary citizens
has a reasonable doubt as to her guilt. Not surprisingly, consistent
with the ideal of the Sixth Amendment, criminal defendants in most
circumstances consider the right to trial by jury an important protec-
tion that they are loathe to waive. There are, however, circumstances
in which a defendant may conclude that she is better off without a
jury. In particular, a defendant who holds unpopular religious or
political beliefs or against whom public opinion has been aroused by
unfavorable publicity, may prefer to have her fate decided by a judge
(particularly a federal judge with life tenure and immunity from the
majoritarian political process) than by a jury drawn from a community
that she perceives as biased against her.19 A defendant may also seek
to waive in a case where the factual or the legal defense or both are
complex or technical.
Dissenting in Duncan v. Louisiana,20 Justice Harlan noted that
the historical function of criminal trial by jury was as a protection
Fourteen people were killed in the McDuffie riots, which resulted in $200 million
in economic damage. See also Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimina-
tion in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway? 92 CoLum. L. REv. 725, 748-49
(1992).
19. Notable criminal defendants who have sought unsuccessfully to waive their jury
rights include former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the Reverend
Sun Myung Moon. See United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.
1983).
20. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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against the tyranny of the government. Justice Harlan argued that
this function has significantly less efficacy in modern democratic
society:
It can hardly be gainsaid, however, that the principal original virtue of thejury trial-the limitations a jury imposes on a tyrannous judiciary-has
largely disappeared. We no longer live in a medieval or colonial society.
Judges enforce laws enacted by democratic decision, not by regal fiat. They
are elected by the people or appointed by the people's elected officials, and are
responsible not to a distant monarch alone but to reviewing courts, including
this one.2 1
As Justice Harlan well illustrated, the jury no longer must act as a
safeguard against a judiciary whose loyalty lies with a royal monarch
rather than the people.
The corollary to Justice Harlan's argument is that, in the modern
context, the jury may be, as much or more so than the court, the
source of danger to the rights of the accused. The source of tyranny in
a democracy is not the tyranny of a monarch, but the tyranny of the
majority. The same public pressure that may lead to a questionable,
politically-motivated or biased prosecution, may affect jurors who
must return to their communities and explain their verdict in favor of
an unpopular defendant. A judge, especially a federal judge with life
tenure, may be better-situated than a jury to withstand the pressure
of public opinion.
In any event, one can assume that a self-interested defendant will
forego the normal advantages of trial by jury only when she genuinely
perceives danger of jury bias. Ironically, however, the very cases that
present the most potential for jury bias against an unpopular defend-
ant will be often those in which the communitarian functions of partic-
ipation, education, and ritual (and resulting catharsis) are most
significant. This is true because in these cases the underlying events,
as well as the legal process, have aroused the greatest public interest
and concern. The public interest in the communitarian function may,
therefore, directly conflict with the legitimate interest of the accused
in waiver.
B. The Federal Rule Prohibiting Waiver Without the
Prosecutor's Consent
If trial by jury were solely a protection for the accused and served
no independent communitarian function, it would follow that the de-
fendant could waive that right at her election. While true in some
jurisdictions,2 2 that is not the case in federal court. Federal Rule of
21. Id. at 188 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22. See Commonwealth v. Wharton, 435 A.2d 158, 163 n.3 (Pa. 1981)("states are al-
most evenly divided as to whether prosecutorial consent should be required for
waiver of a jury trial").
1995] 811
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Procedure 23(a), which had its origin in Patton v. United
States,23 provides in plain language that "[clases required to be tried
by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in
writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the
Government."24
In Singer v. United States,25 in an opinion by Chief Justice War-
ren, the Court upheld the constitutionality of that rule against the
defendant's claim that he had a constitutional right to waive inherent
in his constitutional right to an impartial jury. Singer held that,
under the Sixth Amendment as well as under Article III, Section 2,
the defendant's "only constitutional right concerning the method of
trial is to an impartial trial by jury."26 Therefore, the government can
constitutionally condition waiver on the prosecutor's consent.27 In ad-
dition, the government need not articulate its reasons for demanding
a jury trial.28
Singer left open the question of "whether there might be some cir-
cumstances where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by a
judge alone are so compelling that the government's insistence on trial
by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial
trial."29 The defendant in Singer sought to waive his jury only for the
purpose of shortening the trial.30 Thus, confined to its facts, the
Singer decision is not an absolute grant of governmental power to in-
sist on trial by jury.
The Singer exception applied on its terms, however, is so narrow as
hardly to exist. That a defendant cannot get a fair jury trial can be
demonstrated presumably only where the procedures designed to rem-
edy partiality-including voir dire, change of venue, continuance, jury
sequestration, severance and closure-are shown to be ineffective.
23. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
24. FED. R. Cmam. P. 23(a).
25. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
26. Id. at 35.
27. The courts of Pennsylvania have reached a contrary result. In Commonwealth v.
Wharton, 435 A.2d 158 (Pa. 1981), an equally divided supreme court affirmed a
lower court ruling that invalidated a statute granting the Commonwealth an ab-
solute right to a jury trial despite waiver by the defendant. According to one
justice:
It is particularly offensive to the fair and proper administration of crimi-
nal justice that the prosecution should compel a jury trial, which was
conceived and preserved by the federal and state Constitutions as a pro-
tection for the accused against arbitrary and oppressive law enforce-
ment, for purely arbitrary or tactical reasons .... Such compulsion turns
the protective shield of a jury trial into a sword of the very oppression
which it was intended to prevent.
Id. at 167.
28. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37 (1965).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 26.
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The demonstration of partiality necessary for change of venue is, in
itself, nearly insurmountable in practice. Even a juror who comes into
the courthouse with a preconceived opinion as to the guilt of the ac-
cused is deemed sufficiently impartial if she assures the court that she
can set that opinion aside and decide the case on the evidence.31
A bench trial over the prosecutor's objection under the Singer ex-
ception is, in any case, a logical impossibility. If the defendant is un-
able to get a trial by an impartial jury, a right guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, the charges should be dismissed.32 That is, to meet the
requirements of the Singer exception is also to provide grounds for
dismissal.
In effect, therefore, under Rule 23(a) as upheld by Singer, the pros-
ecutor has an effectively absolute veto over a defendant's jury waiver.
Accordingly, since Singer was decided in 1965, only four reported dis-
trict court cases have allowed waiver over the government's objec-
tion.3 3 Only one of those cases, United States v. Lewis,34 rested its
decision solely on the Singer exception. In Lewis, the Court held that
a defendant who had a sincerely held religious belief that precluded
submitting himself to a jury trial had a First Amendment free exercise
right to waive.35 In the numerous other cases considering Rule 23(a),
denial of the defendant's attempt to waive the jury over the govern-
ment's objection has been affirmed with a strict application of the Fed-
eral Rule.36 Clearly, a legitimate but general fear of bias on the part
of an unpopular or minority defendant will not meet the requirements
of the Singer exception.
C. The Court's Inadequate Attempts to Articulate a Public
Interest Justification for the Requirement of
Prosecutorial Consent
Rule 23(a) had its origin in Patton v. United States.37 As noted
above, in Patton, the Court held for the first time that the constitu-
tional provision for jury trial in criminal cases is not jurisdictional and
may be waived.38 In the final paragraph of a long opinion, however,
31. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
32. See Jon Fieldman, Comment, Singer v. United States and the Misapprehended
Source of the Nonconsensual Bench Trial, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 222 (1984)(so
arguing).
33. See id. at 235-36.
34. 638 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
35. Id.
36. See Fieldman, supra note 32, at 228.
37. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
38. Prior to the Court's 1930 decision in Patton, dicta in earlier cases, widely followed
by lower courts, precluded waiver of trial by jury even with the government's
consent. In Patton, the prosecutor and the defendants stipulated to trial by 11jurors when one of the 12 empanelled jurors became ill during the course of the
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the Court, invoking "experience" and "tradition," stated in dicta that
jury waiver by the defendant must be conditioned on the consent of
government counsel as well as the court:
Trial by jury is the normal and, with occasional exceptions, the preferable
mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases above the grade of petty
offenses. In such cases the value and appropriateness of jury trial have been
established by long experience, and are not now to be denied. Not only must
the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be jealously pre-
served, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body in criminal
cases is of such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, before
any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and the
sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent
consent of the defendant.3 9
That dicta was later codified by the Supreme Court as Rule 23(a) and
endowed with the force of a statute when Congress adopted the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,40 which held that members of the
public have no constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to attend criminal trials, the Court explained in dicta
the holdings of Patton and Singer as based on a "public interest" in
trial by jury in criminal cases distinct from the rights of the accused:
[T]he public has an interest in having a criminal case heard by a jury, an
interest distinct from the defendant's interest in being tried by a jury of his
peers.... Thus because of the great public interest in jury trials as the pre-
ferred mode of fact-finding in criminal cases, a defendant cannot waive a jury
trial without the consent of the prosecutor and judge.41
Gannett gave no explanation, however, of the substance of this public
interest.
The only public interest articulated by Patton is a paternalistic in-
terest in the protection of the accused-that "the liberties and the
lives of the citizens" not "be taken away 'without due process of
law.'"42 Put another way, so long as waiver is intelligent and well-
trial. The defendants were convicted and appealed on the basis that they had no
power to waive their right to trial by a jury of 12 persons. Holding first that the
defendant's right to trial by jury was equivalent to the right to trial by 12 jurors,
the Court faced the jury waiver issue head-on.
The Court framed the issue as being whether the Constitution intended to
establish the jury as a necessary part of the criminal justice process or only to
guarantee to the accused the right to a jury trial. The Court concluded that Arti-
cle III, Section 2 must be read together with the Sixth Amendment not as juris-
dictional but as "confer[ring] a right upon the accused which he may forego at his
election." Id. at 298.
39. Id. at 312.
40. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
41. Id. at 383 (citations to Patton and Singer omitted).
42. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 302 (1930)(quoting Cancemi v. The People,
18 N.Y. 128, 137-38).
Patton itself persuasively disposes of the paternalistic argument for not al-
lowing jury waiver as inconsistent with allowing a plea of guilty:
[Vol. 74:804
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counseled, the public interest articulated in Patton collapses into the
interest of the accused and provides no justification for a restriction on
the rights of the accused. Gannett refers similarly only to a "public
interest in the enforcement of the Sixth Amendment,"43 which again
by its terms is intended solely for the protection of the accused. In
upholding Rule 23(a)'s requirement of government consent to waiver,
Singer provides no further illumination as to the substance of a public
interest in trial by jury that could justify the requirement of govern-
ment consent to jury waiver. Singer merely cites Patton in this regard
and refers to the "Constitution's emphasis on jury trial."44
Singer does, however, introduce a new justification for the rule-
the government's rights as a litigant:
The Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the proper method of de-
termining guilt, and the government as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in
seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried
before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a
fair result.4 5
Certain constitutionally mandated aspects of the criminal justice pro-
cess do not, of course, conform to this model. This would include the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Coexisting with this equal adversary view of the criminal justice
process, is the view that the Constitution has properly weighted the
system in favor of the accused to protect her against the resources and
power of the state. As articulated in Justice Douglas' concurring opin-
ion in Wardius v. Oregon,46 "[tihe Bill of Rights does not envision an
adversary proceeding between two equal parties," but rather "is
designed to redress the advantage" that results from "the awesome
It is difficult to see why the fact, frequently suggested, that the accused
may plead guilty and thus dispense with a trial altogether, does not ef-
fectively disclose the fallacy of the public policy contention; for if the
state may interpose the claim of public interest between the accused and
his desire to waive a jury trial, a fortiori it should be able to interpose a
like claim between him and his determination to avoid any form of trial
by admitting his guilt.
Id. at 305.
43. Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979).
44. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35-36 (1965).
45. Id. at 36. This view of the criminal justice process-a fairly weighted adversary
process-is often traced to Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887), which upheld a
Missouri statute giving peremptory juror challenges to the prosecution in capital
cases. The Court in Hayes observed that "impartiality requires, not only freedom
from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prose-
cution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held." Id. at 70.
The prosecution and the accused are looked at in this model as similar to civil
litigants. As noted in the text, there are many constitutionally mandated aspects
of the criminal justice system that do not conform to this model.
46. 412 U.S. 470 (1973). Wardius held that an Oregon statute precluding introduc-
tion of alibi evidence without pre-trial notice was unconstitutional because it did
not require reciprocal discovery from the government.
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power of indictment and the virtually limitless resources of govern-
ment investigators."47 The Sixth Amendment guarantee of public
trial by jury is, of course, specifically phrased as a right of the accused
and says nothing about the equal litigation rights of the prosecution.
Singer itself justifies an equal adversary rule only through refer-
ence to the fiction of the neutral prosecutor. The Court in Singer
explains:
In upholding the validity of Rule 23(a), we reiterate the sentiment ex-
pressed in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, that the government attor-
ney in a criminal prosecution is not an ordinary party to a controversy, but a
"servant of the law" with a "twofold aim ... that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer." It was in light of this concept of the role of prosecutor that
Rule 23(a) was framed, and we are confident that it is in this light that it will
continue to be invoked by government attorneys. Because of this confidence in
the integrity of the federal prosecutor, Rule 23(a) does not require that the
Government articulate its reasons for demanding a jury trial at the time it
refuses to consent to a defendant's proffered waiver. Nor should we assume
that federal prosecutors would demand a jury trial for an ignoble purpose.4 8
Singer thus creates an unbearable tension between two prosecutorial
roles: that of litigant in an adversary system and that of neutral
agent of justice. While the prosecutor may-fulfill both roles at various
times in the course of a prosecution, she cannot realistically remain a
neutral agent of justice above the adversary fray at the time that she
is asked to consent to jury waiver.
An ethical and conscientious prosecutor will present a case to a
grand jury only against a defendant whom she believes guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Once that decision is made, however, she neces-
sarily and inevitably makes the transition to a litigant in an adver-
sary system. Any decision in the litigation process will be made with a
mind to gaining maximum advantage, within the rules, for a success-
ful prosecution. Analysis of any issue by the prosecutor will be
shaped, consciously or unconsciously, by the prosecutor's genuine be-
lief that the defendant is guilty.49
47. Id. at 480. See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 111-12 (1970)(Black, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)(procedures for criminal trials spelled
out in the Constitution "are designed to shield the defendant against state power"
and "[n]one are designed to make conviction easier").
48. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37 (1965)(some citations omitted). See Ber-
ger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)(government's "interest ... in a crimi-
nal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done").
49. This does not assume any unethical motive or conduct on the part of the prosecu-
tor. Although an ethical prosecutor would not, for example, attempt to sway the
jury by an appeal to prejudice or allow a juror to be seated who has an improper
bias, she will certainly use her peremptory strikes in an effort to obtain a jury
panel that in her judgment, among the range of all persons that could sit on the
panel, is likely to be disposed to find the defendant guilty. Since the prosecutor
genuinely believes in the defendant's guilt, she will perceive those jurors as
unbiased.
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It is, therefore, unrealistic to expect that a prosecutor will respond
to a request for consent to jury waiver based on a balanced, neutral
interest in a fair trial. Except perhaps in a minor case where saving of
time and resources is a controlling issue, the prosecutor will agree to
waiver only if she believes that the court is at least as likely to con-
vict-just as the conscientious defense attorney will advise her client
to waive only if she believes the court is at least as likely to acquit.
This natural litigant's response will be exacerbated in a high-profile
prosecution in which the prosecutor's office is publicly committed to
obtaining a conviction. This kind of case, where press and public opin-
ion have been actively engaged, is, of course, precisely the kind of case
in which a defendant may have a legitimate fear of jury bias and seek
to waive for that reason.
Singer's premise-the neutral prosecutor-is, therefore, false in
the relevant context. A prosecutor is a litigant in an adversary system
who, far from being counted on to act in a neutral manner only to
protect the fair trial rights of the accused, will predictably refuse con-
sent whenever doing so will gain a litigation advantage. The prosecu-
tor's equal rights as a litigant cannot, therefore, serve as a proxy for a
legitimate public interest in criminal trial by jury separate from the
Sixth Amendment rights of the accused. More importantly, justifica-
tion of the requirement of prosecutorial consent by reference to the
prosecutor's rights as a litigant and the myth of prosecutorial neutral-
ity does nothing to explain the substance of the public interest in trial
by jury that the prosecutor is empowered to protect.
D. The Communitarian Function and the Requirement of
Prosecutorial Consent
Thus, none of the public interest rationales for the requirement of
prosecutorial consent articulated by the Supreme Court can withstand'
scrutiny. However, even though never articulated by Patton or Singer
in establishing and enforcing the requirement of prosecutorial consent
to jury waiver, there is a legitimate public interest in criminal trial by
jury: the communitarian function of participation, education and rit-
ual. That function gives substance to the "tradition" invoked by Pat-
ton and Singer and is consistent with the provision for trial by jury in
criminal cases in Article III, Section 2. As already noted, however, the
public interest derived from the communitarian function is greatest in
those cases that have attracted the greatest public attention and con-
troversy. Those are the same cases in which, typically, there is also
the greatest potential for public bias and majority oppression of an
unpopular defendant.
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The tax prosecution of cult leader Sun Myung Moon is illustra-
tive.50 Moon was indicted on various counts of tax evasion and false
statements. At a subsequent rally of his followers, Moon made the
following statement that was partially reprinted as an advertisement
in the New York Times:
I would not be standing here today if my skin were white or my religion were
Presbyterian. I am here today only because my skin is yellow and my religion
is Unification Church. The ugliest things in this beautiful country of America
are religious bigotry and racism.5 1
Consistent with those sentiments, Moon sought to waive his jury. The
prosecutor refused to consent.
Although under Singer, the prosecutor is not obligated to articulate
reasons for refusal to consent, the prosecutor did so in a letter to the
judge. That letter invoked the ritual aspect of the communitarian
function of trial by jury:
In response to defense efforts to waive a trial by jury, the prosecutor wrote
a letter to Judge Goettel dated March 11, 1982 stating her opposition and,
referring to [Moon's statement reprinted in the New York Times], adding that
defendants had raised-and circulated world-wide-questions about "the in-
tegrity and motives of the prosecution." It was the prosecutor's conclusion
that a single fact-finder would be placed in an "untenable" position and that
there was an overriding public interest in the appearance as well as the fact of
a fair trial, which could be achieved only by a jury. The government insisted
that employing this normal and preferable mode of disposing of fact issues in
a criminal trial would defuse the public criticism that had been leveled by
Moon.5 2
The prosecutor's letter did not explain why the decision of a jury
would be less susceptible than that of a judge to continued claims by
Moon of religious bigotry and racism.
Moon argued, in support of waiver, "that there was a reasonable
likelihood in advance that public animosity toward Moon and his reli-
gion would prevent a fair trial," that this likelihood was exacerbated
by his public statements, and "that the subject matter of this tax fraud
prosecution, together with the sheer volume of complicated exhibits,
turned this trial into one of mesmerizing complexity" inappropriate for
a jury.5a Moon also argued, based on the prosecutor's citation of his
public statement as a basis for refusal to consent, that the refusal
"punish[ed] Moon for exercising his First Amendment rights."54
Following Singer and relying on review of the record of voir dire,55
the Second Circuit affirmed Moon's conviction. It did so without ex-
50. United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2nd Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 1217.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1218 & n.1.
54. Id. at 1218.
55. Based on the record, the Second Circuit was "convince[d] ... of the accuracy of
the trial court's finding after selection was completed that 'we have gotten a jury
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plicitly acknowledging the tension between the prosecutor's communi-
tarian justification for insistence on trial by jury and Moon's
legitimate concerns about juror bias. Therefore, on the insistence of
the prosecutor, and through application of Singer and Patton, Moon
was forced to trial by jury despite his willingness to entrust his fate to
a single judge; and despite the fact that, according to those same cases
and their progeny, the constitutional provision of trial by jury was in-
tended solely as a protection for the accused against the arbitrary
power of government.
The only possible justification for this result, and for the federal
rule requiring prosecutorial consent, is that which was partially ar-
ticulated by the prosecutor.56 The prosecutor in Moon was implicitly
appealing to the communitarian values of participation, education and
ritual affrration of faith in the administration of justice (including
catharsis), each of which is heightened in high-profile cases that have
stirred public emotions and controversy. Those values must, however,
be weighed against the danger of majoritarian bias to the accused,
whose willingness to forego her Sixth Amendment right to a jury, com-
bined with the great difficulty of demonstrating actual bias, should
give presumptive legitimacy to a claim of bias in the jury pool.
Patton and Singer and their progeny, by invoking tradition and the
fiction of the neutral prosecutor, never acknowledge the balance that
they ultimately strike in favor of the communitarian function and
against the accused who seeks waiver. While there may be circum-
stances in which the communitarian function justifies denial of the
accused's attempt to waive her jury right,57 the prosecutor, a litigant
in an adversary system, is certainly not the appropriate party in
whom to invest that discretion. Yet, that is the result of the holdings
in Patton and Singer.
Even assuming that discretion were more properly invested in the
court alone, the question remains as to how that discretion should be
exercised. In other words, how should the court balance the genuine
public interest in trial by jury (that derived from the communitarian
function) against the defendant's desire to waive the jury and her pre-
sumptively valid fear of jury bias? As developed more thoroughly in
Part VI within, three principles argne for a presumption in favor of
the accused: 1) the Sixth Amendment's specific reference to trial by
jury as a right of the accused and the absence of similar constitutional
which is, if not totally free from bias, by and large capable of putting aside the
bias they have and deciding the case on the merits of the charges.'" Id.
56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
57. A particularly compelling case might exist, for example, when the defendant is a
high official of the government who, by seeking waiver, seeks to be tried solely by
ajudge, another high official of the same government. That circumstance would
present a particular threat to public faith in the administration of justice and
might justify denial of waiver in the absence of genuine potential for jury bias.
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articulation of a separate, public interest; 2) the danger in a demo-
cratic society of majoritarian bias, which may find expression in the
jury, and the traditional role of the independent judiciary to protect
against that bias, particularly through enforcement of the Bill of
Rights; and 3) the compromise of the communitarian goal of faith in
the administration of justice that will result if a defendant with a le-
gitimate fear of jury bias is not allowed to waive.
The burden, therefore, should be on the government to overcome
this presumption by a clear showing that there is no particularized
danger of jury bias in the circumstances of the case. That showing
might be made on the record of voir dire, but the standard would nec-
essarily be more rigorous than that required to defeat a motion for
change of venue.58 Again, the purpose of presumption in favor of the
accused would be to protect a defendant who seeks waiver from the
difficult to demonstrate, but nonetheless real, danger of facing trial by
a jury selected from a community in which bias is widespread. As
such, the government should have the burden of demonstrating, not
only that a jury can be obtained comprised of individuals who purport
to be able to put aside any preconception or bias, but further, that
there is no general bias against the defendant in the pool from which
the jury will be selected.
IV. JURY SELECTION
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the accused "an impartial
jury" but is silent with regard to the composition of the jury and the
means of its selection. Case law interpreting the demands of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the
Sixth Amendment as they apply to jury selection has emphasized the
communitarian function of the jury, as well as the rights of defendants
and the rights of individual jurors. As in the case of the right to trial
by jury itself, the interest of the accused in jury selection is generally
consistent with the communitarian function of the jury, but it is some-
times at odds with it. Recent holdings of the Supreme Court limiting
the use of preemptory strikes by criminal defendants have implicitly
weighed the value of the communitarian function, especially its ritual
value for fostering community faith in the administration of justice,
against the interest of the accused in selection of impartial jurors.
58. A change of venue also burdens to some degree the communitarian function since
it precludes the community in which the alleged crime was committed from par-
ticipating in the trial.
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A. The Fair-Cross-Section Requirement
In Taylor v. Louisiana,59 the Court held that "the presence of a fair
cross section of the community on venires, panels, or lists from which
petit juries are drawn, is essential to the fulfillment of the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury trial in criminal prosecu-
tions."60 The Court accordingly reversed the conviction of a male de-
fendant because of systematic exclusion of women from the venire.6 1
In establishing a fair-cross-section requirement under the Sixth
Amendment, the Court justified that requirement, first of all, as es-
sential to the function of the jury as a protection of the accused
against the arbitrary power of government. The Court said:
The purpose of the jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary
power-to make available the common sense judgment of the community as a
hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the
professional or perhaps over conditioned or biased response of a judge. This
prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the jury pool is made up of only special
segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the
pool. 6 2
This would seem to be a necessary and sufficient justification for a
holding under the Sixth Amendment.
The Court went on immediately, however, to state:
Community participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover,
is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. .... "Trial by jury
presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the commu-
nity as well as impartial in a specific case .... [T]he broad representative
character of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused
impartiality and partly because sharing in the administration of justice is a
phase of civic responsibility" 63
59. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
60. Id. at 526.
61. The Louisiana jury selection system at issue did not exclude all women from the
venire but included them only if they had previously executed a written declara-
tion of desire to be subject to jury service. There were no women on the venire
from which the defendant's petit jury was selected.
62. Id. at 530 (citation omitted). See also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480
(1990)("The fair-cross-section venire requirement is obviously not explicit in [the
text of the Sixth Amendment], but is derived from the traditional understanding
of how an 'impartial jury' is assembled.").
63. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)(quoting Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). See also Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-75 (1986)(analyzing Taylor and identifying three pur-
poses for the fair-cross-section requirement: "(1) 'guard[ing] against the exercise
of arbitrary power' and ensuring that the 'common sense judgment of the commu-
nity' will act as 'a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor,' (2) pre-
serving 'public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system,' and (3)
implementing our belief that 'sharing in the administration of justice is a phase
of civic responsibility.' ").
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Thus, the Court invoked the participatory and ritual aspects of the
communitarian function to give further justification for the fair-cross-
section requirement. In doing so, despite founding its decision on the
Sixth Amendment, the Court shifted its emphasis from the criminal
jury's function as a protection of the accused to its function as a demo-
cratic vehicle for community participation.
The fair-cross-section requirement has been held to apply only to
the venire and not to the petit jury.64 Nor is a criminal defendant
entitled to a proportionate number of her race or gender on either the
venire or the petit jury.65 The function of the fair-cross-section re-
quirement in eliminating bias from the petit jury is, therefore, impor-
tant but limited. By prohibiting discrimination in the composition of
the venire from which the petit jury will be selected, it furthers the
communitarian values of participation and ritual affirmation at the
same time that it assures the accused that persons of her race or na-
tionality or gender will be included in the pool of potential jurors. It
does nothing, however, to eliminate the selection of biased jurors from
that venire.
B. The Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
1. Swain and the Traditional Function of Peremptory
Challenges in Securing an Impartial Jury
Other than the fair-cross-section venire requirement and the right
to strike jurors with demonstrable bias for cause, the criminal defend-
ant's only vehicle to exercise control over the composition of the petit
jury, and thereby to eliminate potentially biased jurors, is through the
exercise of peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges are a speci-
fied number of challenges without cause traditionally allowed to both
the defendant and the government. 66 The exercise of peremptory
challenges has been recognized by the Court as an important part of
the selection of an impartial jury but has not been accorded constitu-
tional protection as a fundamental part of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee.
The history and significance of the peremptory challenge was set
forth at length in Justice White's opinion for the Court .in Swain v.
Alabama,67 which summarized its quasi-constitutional status as
follows:
64. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-74 (1986); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 538 (1975).
65. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965).
66. See Jennifer Lee Urbanski, Note, Georgia v. McCollum: Protecting Jurors from
Race-Based Peremptory Challenges But Forcing Criminal Defendants to Risk Bi-
ased Juries, 24 PAc. L.J. 1887, 1885-1902 (1993)(discussing history of peremptory
challenges and use to eliminate jury bias).
67. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
[Vol. 74:804
COMMUNITARIAN FUNCTION
The persistence of peremptories and their extensive use demonstrate the long
and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by
jury. Although "[tihere is nothing in the Constitution of the United States
which requires the Congress (or the States) to grant peremptory challenges,"
nonetheless the challenge is "one of the most important of the rights secured
to the accused, [sic]" The denial or impairment of the right is reversible error
without a showing of prejudice.6 8
Ironically, Swain invoked the centrality of the peremptory strike to
the selection of an impartial jury as justification for denying the black
defendant/petitioner's claim that the government's striking of all non-
exempt black jurors from the venire was a violation of Equal Protec-
tion. No black had been left on a petit jury in a criminal case in the
Alabama county at issue for more than ten years.
In upholding the government's exercise of peremptory challenges,
the Court emphasized the arbitrary nature of the peremptory chal-
lenge as essential to its function in the selection of an impartial jury.
The Court stated:
The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised
without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the
court's control.... While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a
narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the per-
emptory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily
designated or demonstrable.6 9
The Court in Swain thus believed that the arbitrary nature of the per-
emptory challenge served to protect the accused against partiality
that would be difficult to demonstrate but might nonetheless be real.
Swain specifically validated the practice of using race or other sus-
pect qualifications as surrogates for partiality in a particular case:
[The peremptory strike] is no less frequently exercised on grounds normally
thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, reli-
gion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury
duty.[ ] For the question a prosecutor or defense counsel must decide is not
whether a juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but
whether one from a different group is less likely to be....
... In the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Prot-
estant and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without cause. To
subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands and
traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical
change in the nature and operation of the challenge.70
The Court held that in order to establish a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a defendant would have to show not only that the gov-
ernment had excluded jurors on the basis of race in her trial, but that
the government had done so systematically in the jurisdiction without
regard to the specific case. 71
68. Id. at 219.
69. Id. at 220 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 220-22.
71. Id. at 224.
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2. Batson and the Limitations of the Government's Use of
Peremptory Strikes
Just over 20 years later, Swain was overruled in Batson v. Ken-
tucky. 72 The Court held in Batson that a criminal defendant could
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination solely on evi-
dence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at
the defendant's trial. It specifically disallowed the government's use
of race as a predictor of bias, stating:
ET]he prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimina-
tion by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the
assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the de-
fendant because of their shared race.... [T]he Equal Protection Clause...
forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption that they will
be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black.73
Like Swain, Batson involved a black defendant's challenge to the gov-
ernment's use of peremptory strikes to exclude black jurors.
Not surprisingly, the Court looked first to impairment of the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial.
Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a de-
fendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a
trial by jury is intended to secure.... The petit jury has occupied a central
position in our system of justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime
against the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or judge. Those on the
venire must be "indifferently chosen," to secure the defendant's right under
the Fourteenth Amendment to "protection of life and liberty against race or
color prejudice."7 4
Indeed, on certain assumptions, the prosecutor's ability to strike mi-
nority jurors in the trial of a minority defendant will frustrate rather
than further the purpose of obtaining an impartial jury. If one as-
sumes that members of the majority race are more apt to be biased
against the minority defendant, and that jurors are represented in the
venire in proportion to the general population, a prosecutor who sys-
tematically strikes minority jurors may be able to secure a jury that is
predominantly or entirely composed of majority jurors with a greater
tendency towards bias.
This reasoning would also support a finding of a violation of the
Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the defendant "an impartial
jury." Significantly, however, the Court decided Batson solely based
on the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court did so despite the fact that
the defendant/petitioner "disclaimed specifically any reliance on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pressing in-
stead only a claim based on the Sixth Amendment."75
72. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
73. Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 86-87 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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That the Court was unwilling to limit the government's use of per-
emptory challenges based on the accused's right to an impartial jury
under the Sixth Amendment was confirmed four years later in Hol-
land v. Illinois.76 In Holland, the Supreme Court denied a white de-
fendant's claim that exclusion of black jurors violated the Sixth
Amendment. While, as is implicit above, a majority race defendant
may not be .able to demonstrate the same impairment of fair trial
rights as an otherwise similarly situated minority defendant, the
Court in Holland, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, made no such fine
distinctions:
We reject petitioner's fundamental thesis that a prosecutor's use of per-
emptory challenges to eliminate a distinctive group in the community de-
prives the defendant of a Sixth Amendment right to the "fair possibility" of a
representative jury ... A prohibition upon the exclusion of cognizable groups
through peremptory challenges has no conceivable basis in the text of the
Sixth Amendment, is without support in our prior decisions, and would under-
mine rather than further the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury.77
Thus, the Sixth Amendment was held to be simply not applicable to
the peremptory challenge debate.
Since the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impar-
tial jury and a fair trial cannot be meaningfully separated from his
Sixth Amendment rights, which are insufficient under the Court's ju-
risprudence to justify limitation on the government's use of perempto-
ries,78 further explanation must be found for the rule announced in
Batson. In articulating a justification that might better explain its
holding, the Court in Batson relied on the individual rights of ex-
cluded jurors and the participatory and ritual aspects of the criminal
jury's communitarian function:
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused
whose life or liberty they are summoned to try.... As long ago as Strauder,
... the Court recognized that by denying a person participation injury service
on account of his race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated against the
excluded juror....
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted
on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selec-
tion procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries under-
mine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.79
76. 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990).
77. Id.
78. As stated by Justice Rehnquist in dissent: "The Court does not suggest that ex-
clusion of blacks from the jury through the State's use of peremptory challenges
results in a violation of either the fair-cross-section or impartiality component of
the Sixth Amendment. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 138 (1986)(Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 87. See also Underwood, supra note 18, at 748-50 (arguing that race-basedjury selection damages public confidence in jury verdicts).
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Thus, the prevention of discriminatory jury selection was held to serve
the communitarian function of maintaining public confidence in the
judicial system.
"Public confidence" and its sources are, however, somewhat nebu-
lous commodities. They are subject to interpretation, as well as to
genuine change, as the center of gravity of public opinion shifts over
time. In 1965, in Swain, the Court also emphasized public confidence
in the administration ofjustice. It assumed, however, contrary to Bat-
son's limitation on peremptory use, that maintenance of the peremp-
tory system was integral to selection of an impartial jury and,
therefore to public confidence. The Court explained:
The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality
on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try
the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not
otherwise. In this way the peremptory satisfies the rule that "to perform its
high function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice.' "8o
Twenty-one years later, in Batson, the Court minority still adhered to
the same model of public confidence: "[Tloday's holding will produce
juries that the parties do not believe are truly impartial. This will
surely do more than 'disconcert' litigants; it will diminish confidence
in the jury system.."1 But, as already discussed, in the view of the
Court majority, by 1986, exclusion by the government of jurors on the
basis of race could no longer co-exist with the criminal jury's ritual
function of maintaining the faith of the community in the administra-
tion of justice.
In a first extension of Batson, in Powers v. Ohio,82 the Court re-
versed the result in Holland by application of the Fourteenth rather
than the Sixth Amendment, holding that a criminal defendant may
object to race-based exclusions of jurors through peremptory chal-
lenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the
same race. The Court reached that result without finding any impair-
ment of the defendant's own rights. Instead, it relied solely on the
defendant's standing to raise the third-party equal protection claims
of the jurors excluded by the prosecution because of their race. As set
forth above in Part II, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Pow-
ers places significant emphasis not only on the rights of excluded ju-
rors but on all three aspects of the communitarian function.
In Powers, which reversed the conviction of a white defendant
based on exclusion of black jurors, however, the interests of the de-
fendant remained allied with the jury's perceived communitarian
function. "The purpose of the jury system," according to Powers, "is to
80. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)(citation omitted).
81. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 129 (1986).
82. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
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impress upon the criminal defendant and the community as a whole
that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with the
law by persons who are fair."83 The expression of the jury's ritual
function remained wedded to the perception, if not the reality, of a fair
trial for the accused: "[Rlacial discrimination in the selection of jurors
'casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process,' and places the
fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt."84 The jury acts as a vital
check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State and its pros-
ecutors, and the intrusion of racial discrimination into the jury selec-
tion process damages both the fact and the perception of this
guarantee.8 5 Still, after Batson and Powers, the accused, in contrast
to the government, remained free to exercise peremptory challenges
without justification and without court scrutiny.
3. McCollum and the Limitation of the Defendant's Use of
Peremptories: The Communitarian Function in
Conflict with the Rights of the Accused
In the circumstances of the Batson and Power cases, the fulfillment
of the jury's communitarian function as perceived by the Court was
consistent with the minority defendant's interest in avoiding the as-
sumed partiality of a jury purged of minority jurors. However, subse-
quent extensions of Batson have put the communitarian function in
opposition to the accused's right to an impartial jury. While those
cases have emphasized the rights of individual jurors as well as the
interests of the community, the results in those cases can ultimately
be explained only as a balancing by the Court of the communitarian
function against the rights of the accused.
Two months after the announcement of the decision in Powers, the
Court held, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.86 that a private liti-
gant in a civil case may not use peremptory challenges to exclude ju-
rors on account of race. While not directly affecting the rights of the
criminally accused, the decision in Edmonson laid the groundwork, in
two important ways, for subsequent extensions of Batson that would
do so. First, the court held that private litigants are state actors when
they exercise peremptory challenges. Secondly, in Edmonson, for the
first time, the Court expressed a model of the ritual aspect of the jury's
communitarian function completely independent of the protection of
the accused from the arbitrary power of government and the fairness
of the process to the litigants:
Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of
democratic government from becoming a reality ....
83. Id. at 413.
84. Id. at 411 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
85. Id at 86.
86. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
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It may be true that the role of litigants in determining the jury's composi-
tion provides one reason for wide acceptance of the jury system and of its ver-
dicts. But if race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel as
fair, the price is too high to meet the standard of the Constitution.87
In other words, notwithstanding its possible prejudicial effects for the
defendant, the communitarian interest in the "integrity of the judicial
system" conclusively demands that racial discrimination not be a part
of peremptory challenges.
The implications of this balance in favor of the communitarian in-
terest for the criminal defendant, and the minority criminal defendant
in particular, were recognized by Justice Scalia in dissent:
The effect of today's decision (which logically must apply to criminal prosecu-
tions) will be to prevent the defendant from [exercising race-based strikes]-
so that the minority defendant can no longer seek to prevent an all-white jury,
or to seat as many jurors of his own race as possible.88
Fulfilling Justice Scalia's prediction, one term later, in Georgia v. Mc-
Collum,89 the Court extended the Edmonson rule to criminal cases.
The Supreme Court held for the first time that the Constitution pro-
hibits a criminal defendant from exercising peremptory challenges on
the basis of race.
In order to reach that result, the Court in McCollum broke new
ground to hold that a criminal defendant is herself a state actor when
exercising peremptory challenges. As Justice O'Connor put it in dis-
sent: "The Court reaches the remarkable conclusion that criminal de-
fendants being prosecuted by the State act on behalf of their
adversary when they exercise peremptory challenges during jury se-
lection."9 0 While presaged by the questionable holding in Edmonson
that civil litigants are state actors when exercising peremptory chal-
lenges,9 1 the actual holding that a criminal defendant-whose Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial was "granted ... to prevent oppres-
87. Id. at 628-30.
88. Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
90. Id. at 62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91. Justice O'Connor in dissent in McCollum distinguished between state action
analysis when applied to civil litigants and when applied to criminal defendants.
While the nonpartisan administrative interests of the State and partisan
interests of private litigants may not be at odds during civil jury selec-
tion, the same cannot be said of the partisan interests of the State dur-
ing jury selection in a criminal trial. A private civil litigant opposes a
private counterpart, but a criminal defendant is by design in an adver-
sarial relationship with the government. Simply put, the defendant
seeks to strike jurors predisposed to convict, while the State seeks to
strike jurors predisposed to acquit.
Id. at 2363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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sion by the Government,"92-is a state actor at a critical stage in the
proceedings against her, was nonetheless breathtaking.93
The Court also held implicitly that a criminal defendant who exer-
cises peremptory challenges on the basis of race is engaged in pur-
poseful discrimination.94 The Court explained:
This Court firmly has rejected the view that assumptions of partiality based
on race provide a legitimate basis for disqualifying a person as an impartial
juror.... We therefore reaffirm today that the exercise of a peremptory chal-
lenge must not be based on either the race of the juror or the racial stereo-
types held by the party.95
In sum, race as a surrogate for partiality was no longer unacceptable.
While unassailable in a sense, once it is held that the defendant is
a state actor, the holding that a criminal defendant cannot assume
that a juror is less likely to be sympathetic to her case based on race
(or gender or perhaps other suspect categories) highlights the tension
between the communitarian function of a trial by jury and the interest
of the accused in obtaining impartial jurors. The goal of a society free
from racial bias and stereotype and the importance of affirming that
goal in the conduct of court proceedings are at odds with the attempts
of a criminal defendant to deal with the reality of continued bias in the
community from which the jury pool is drawn. While the use of racial
stereotypes is nonetheless odious, it can be presumed that a defend-
ant, particularly one faced with serious charges, will exercise chal-
lenges based on race only if she genuinely believes that jurors of one
race are more likely to be biased against her. Her "purpose" in that
sense, though perhaps misguided by stereotypes, is not discrimination
but freedom from juror bias.
Ironically, the idea that race and other suspect categories are legit-
imate predictors of bias was enunciated by the Supreme Court itself
only 25 years earlier in Swain: "defense counsel must decide.., not
whether a juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but
whether one from a different group is less likely to be."96 Moreover, as
pointed out by Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in McCollum,
the assumption that the racial composition of a jury may affect the
outcome in a criminal case is implicit in the holding in Strauder v.
92. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
93. See Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory
Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARv. L. REv.
808 (1989)(arguing prior to McCollum that criminal defendant cannot be state
actor). See also Urbanski, supra note 66, at 1935-41 (arguing that McCollum
erred in holding that criminal defendant is state actor).
94. Since Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), a governmental action to be ra-
cially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment "must ultimately
be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." Id. at 240.
95. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58 (1992).
96. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1965).
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West Virginia,97 which reversed a conviction and invalidated a state
law that prohibited blacks from serving on juries. As Justice Thomas
explained Strauder: "We reasonably surmised, without direct evi-
dence in any particular case, that all-white juries might judge black
defendants unfairly."98
Though the burden of the holding in McCollum will fall most heav-
ily on the minority defendant, who will be prohibited from using per-
emptory challenges in an attempt to obtain a jury that includes
members of her race, the facts of McCollum presented the opposite
situation. In McCollum, it was a white defendant who sought to use
peremptory challenges to eliminate minority jurors. Confronted with
those facts, the Court majority in McCollum was clearly motivated in
large part by its perception of the criminal jury trial's communitarian
function of promoting public confidence in the administration of jus-
tice. The issue of public confidence was presented in McCollum, not
abstractly, but in the context of recent race riots in response to jury
verdicts acquitting white defendants. The Court explicitly stated,
"Public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system is es-
sential for preserving community peace in trials involving race-related
crimes." The Court referred to a law review article "describing two
trials in Miami, Fl[orid]a, in which all African-American jurors were
peremptorily struck by white defendants accused of racial beating,
and the public outrage and riots that followed the defendants'
acquittal."99
Furthermore, race was alleged to be a factor in the charged assault
and battery.lOO A leaflet had been "widely distributed in the local Af-
rican-American community reporting the assault and urging commu-
nity residents not to patronize respondents' business."10o The
prosecutor moved prior to the commencement of trial for a prohibition
on race-based strikes by the defendants. The Court thus decided Mc-
Collum against the specter of the community's expected reaction to
acquittal of the white defendant by a jury from which black jurors had
been removed by the defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges.
The rule enunciated in McCollum will necessarily, however, be ap-
plied to minority defendants as well. Minority defendants will, there-
fore, be prevented from exercising race-based peremptory strikes in an
attempt to secure minority representation on the jury.'0 2 As stated
97. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
98. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61 (1992).
99. Id. at 49 (citing Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. Ray. 153
(1989)).
100. Id. at 44.
101. Id.
102. As stated by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund's amicus brief in
McCollum and quoted by Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion:
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succinctly by Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion: "I am certain
that black criminal defendants will rue the day that this court ven-
tured down this road that inexorably will lead to the elimination of
peremptory strikes."103
The majority in McCollum purported to address directly the bur-
den of its decision on the criminal defendant: "The final question is
whether the interests served by Batson must give way to the rights of
a criminal defendant."104 Its analysis, however, begs the question by
assuming its conclusion, i.e., that a defendant's racially based peremp-
tory strikes are unlawful. The Court had already concluded that
"neither the Sixth Amendment right nor the attorney-client privilege
gives a criminal defendant the right to carry out through counsel an
unlawful course of conduct."'105
Once again, it was left for Justice Thomas, who concurred in the
result, to speak plainly:
In Strauder, we put the rights of defendants foremost. Today's decision, while
protecting jurors, leaves defendants with less means of protecting themselves.
Unless jurors actually admit prejudice during voir dire, defendants generally
must allow them to sit and run the risk that racial animus will affect the
verdict.... In effect, we have exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries over
the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the
jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death.10 6
What Justice Thomas failed to acknowledge was the additional factor
that shifted the balance in favor of the juror and against the accused:
the Court's perception that the ritual aspect of the jury's communitar-
ian function will not allow for the use, even by a criminal defendant, of
race as a surrogate for bias. It is not only the rights of jurors, but the
myth or goal of freedom from group bias that is exalted over the rights
of the accused.
The ability to use peremptory challenges to exclude majority race jurors
may be crucial to empaneling a fair jury. In many cases an African
American, or other minority defendant, may be faced with a jury array
in which his racial group is underrepresented to some degree, but not
sufficiently to permit challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
only possible chance the defendant may have of having any minority ju-
rors on the jury that actually tries him will be if he uses his peremptories
to strike members of the majority race.
Id. at 69 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 60.
104. Id. at 57.
105. Id. at 58.
106. Id. at 61-62. See also The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 106 HAv. L. REv.
163, 241 (1992)("In striking its latest blow against race-based jury selection, the
Court has saved prospective jurors from the dignitary harm caused by race-based
peremptories only by subjecting criminal defendants to the greater risk that they
will be deprived of life or liberty because of their race. Moreover, the Court sub-
stituted one discriminatory evil for another without critically assessing the rela-
tive harms of each.").
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Most recently, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B.,107 the Court ex-
tended Batson to prohibit peremptory strikes based on gender. While
J.E.B. reversed a conviction based on the government's exercise of
peremptory challenges, given the precedent of McCollum, its prohibi-
tion will necessarily be extended to criminal defendants as well. Pro-
hibition of gender-based strikes must surmount a logical barrier not
faced in the case of race-based strikes. Since women are not a numeri-
cal minority, peremptory challenges against them by one party will
not result in their exclusion from petit juries, especially where, as will
commonly be the case, the other party uses peremptory challenges to
exclude men.
The Court dispensed with this fact in a footnote:
It is irrelevant that women, unlike African-Americans, are not a numerical
minority and therefore are likely to remain on the jury if each side uses its
peremptory challenges in an equally discriminatory fashion.... The exclusion
of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms that juror and undermines
public confidence in the fairness of the system.10 8
Since, in the case of gender, there is no danger of regular exclusion of
jurors of either sex, the burden of the Court's holding must rest almost
entirely on the Court's perception of "public confidence in the fairness
of the system,"' 0 9 that is, the ritual aspect of the communitarian func-
tion. The Court emphasized that:
The community is harmed by the State's participation in the perpetuation of
invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our judi-
cial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom engenders.
When state actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on gender
stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities
of men and women. 110
Thus, putting aside the communitarian interest in justice for the liti-
gants, the Court in J.E.B. held that the mere presence of stereotypes
and discrimination in a public trial results in an unacceptable harm to
the community.
Given that, in general, one cannot expect prosecutors or defend-
ants to exercise challenges more often against one sex than the other,
and that gender-based challenges will not result, therefore, in system-
atic exclusion of either men or women, it is not at all clear how the
striking of men or women in a particular case will adversely affect the
trial's communitarian function. In particular, it is unclear how gen-
der-based peremptory strikes would reflect on the relative abilities of
either gender or how it would shake public confidence in the adminis-
107. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
108. Id. at 1428 n.13.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1427.
[Vol. 74:804
COMMUNITARIAN FUNCTION
tration of justice.111 Finally, it should not be forgotten that although
the Court in J.E.B. relied heavily for its decision on the historical dis-
crimination against women, its holding was to reverse the conviction
of a male defendant in a paternity action because the government
used its peremptory strikes to excuse potential male jurors.
While the holding of J.E.B. was to reverse the conviction of a crimi-
nal defendant, its ultimate effect is inevitably to limit further the use
of peremptory challenges by both the government and defendants.
Thus, the effect of J.E.B. is to impair whatever value the peremptory
system has for securing an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. Since one cannot expect that either sex will be dispro-
portionately subject to peremptory exclusion, the virtually sole justifi-
cation for that holding is the ritual aspect of the communitarian
function and the Court's perception that gender-based strikes will un-
dermine the faith of the community in the administration of justice.
4. Conclusions
By disallowing race-based peremptory strikes by criminal defend-
ants in McCollum and gender-based strikes, as is the inevitable result
of J.E.B., the Court has implicitly concluded that the communitarian
function of the criminal jury, and particularly its ritual purpose of
maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice, justi-
fies a significant burden on the ability of the defendant to eliminate
potentially biased jurors. Thus, the trial's communitarian ritual pur-
pose may place a significant burden on a criminal defendant's right to
obtain a fair trial. While the Court's decisions emphasize the rights of
individual jurors, which are closely allied in any case with the par-
ticipatory aspect of the communitarian function, they also invoke the
communitarian function and can be fully explained, especially in the
case of gender-based strikes, only by reference to that function. The
Court has held, in effect, that the goal of freedom from group bias, and
the perceived importance to that goal of not allowing expressions of
group bias in court proceedings, justify limitations on the ability of the
accused to eliminate potentially biased jurors.
Ironically, it is the reality of continued group bias that makes that
holding a burden on the accused, particularly the minority defendant.
Implicit in the NAACP's amicus argument in McCollum-that "[t]he
ability to use peremptory challenges to exclude majority race jurors
may be crucial to empaneling a fair jury"312--is the belief that major-
ity race jurors are more likely to be biased against a minority defend-
111. Justice O'Connor argued in dissent, with reference to cases of rape, sexual har-
assment, child custody and spousal or child abuse, that "one need not be a sexist
to share the intuition that in certain cases a person's gender and resulting life
experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case." Id. at 1432.
112. See supra note 102.
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ant. Without the use of race-based peremptory challenges, the
minority defendant may have no ability to secure minority representa-
tion on her jury.
Unlike the defendant's right to jury waiver, which presents a sim-
ple balance between the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused and
the public's interest in the communitarian function of trial by jury, the
defendant's right to exercise group-based challenges also implicates
the Fourteenth Amendment rights of jurors and the paramount public
goal of eliminating race and gender discrimination. Nonetheless, as in
the case of jury waiver, the ritual purpose of promoting public confi-
dence and faith in the administration of justice is significantly com-
promised if the result is to burden the defendant's ability to obtain an
impartial jury. Nor should the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
an impartial jury be summarily swept aside, as it was by the majority
in McCollum, with the conclusory assertion that the Sixth Amend-
ment does not justify discrimination. The defendant may herself be a
victim of majoritarian bias with no means other than peremptory
challenges to attempt to obtain a jury that is the least prone to bias
against her.
Therefore, even assuming the correctness of the McCollum Court's
holding that the defendant is a state actor when she exercises peremp-
tory challenges,113 a minority defendant's use of group-based chal-
lenges to secure minority representation on the petit jury should be
presumptively valid and not subject to the justification requirements
of Batson/McCollum. This conclusion is justified by the historical pur-
pose of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Sixth Amendment
rights of the accused. It should be presumed that such challenges are
for the legitimate purpose of avoiding the effects of historical
discrimination.
V. THE PUBLIC TRIAL GUARANTEE
"Public trial" is mandated by the Sixth Amendment and is a right
of the accused. As set forth in Estes v. Texas, "The purpose of the re-
quirement of a public trial was to guarantee that the accused would be
fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. History has proven
that secret tribunals were effective instruments of oppression."114
Members of the public have no right under the Sixth and Fourteenth
113. This issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
114. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965). See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 588 (1965)(Harlan, J., concurring)("[T]he right of public trial' is not one be-
longing to the public, but one belonging to the accused."); In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 270 (1948)(public trial is a "safeguard against any attempt to employ our
courts as instruments of persecution").
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Amendments to attend criminal trials.115 The public nature of crimi-
nal trials is, of course, also essential to their communitarian function.
If not public, the participatory, educational and ritual aspects of the
criminal trial's communitarian function would all be severely
curtailed.
The televising of criminal trials, an issue that presented itself for
the first time in the 1960s, would seem to provide a significant oppor-
tunity for expansion of the communitarian function. Televised cover-
age of criminal trials has the potential to increase by orders of
magnitude the community of citizens able to observe trials directly.
This is particularly true of those criminal proceedings that have
aroused public interest and controversy and would therefore presuma-
bly be prime objects for television coverage.1 36
A criminal defendant may, on the other hand, believe that televi-
sion coverage will impair her right to an impartial jury and a fair
trial.117 Televised coverage of preliminary proceedings or other as-
pects of the criminal process to which the jury is not privy, may, for
example, subvert the rules of evidence by exposing jurors or potential
jurors to inadmissible evidence or argument. An unpopular defendant
may also believe with justification that televised coverage will in-
crease the pressure on the jury for conviction and will inhibit the will-
ingness of defense witnesses to come forward and testify candidly.
Even judges, it is argued, may be affected in the performance of their
duties by the presence of television cameras. In general, television
coverage can be expected to amplify the majoritarian pressures that
may bias the fair trial rights of an unpopular defendant.
115. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1979). Though the press has
certain rights of access to trials based on the First Amendment, those rights must
yield whenever they impinge on the fair trial rights of the accused.
116. The trial of O.J. Simpson attracted unprecedented numbers of television viewers.
See, e.g., Hal Bodeker, Simpson's Verdict Drew Best Ratings in TVHistory;About
75% of U.S. Adults Watched, And That Doesn't Count the People Watching
Outside of Their Homes, ThE ORLANmo SENTINEL, Oct. 5, 1995, at A4; Fred Brun-
ing, The Simpson Trial; A Must TV Watch, MAcLEAN's, Apr. 17, 1995, at 13; 50
Million Watch TV Court Drama; A Murder of Jealousy; O.J. Simpson The Trial!,
ScoTrmH DAmY RECOPD & SUNDAY MAIL, Jan. 25, 1995, at 12; The Simpson Case;
57% Watched the Verdict, N.Y. Tnuss, Oct. 5, 1995, at 18B ("About 107.7 million
people, or 57 percent of the nation's adult populations watched the live telecast of
the verdict in O.J. Simpson's murder trial... according to a survey commissioned
by the Cable News Network.").
117. This will not always be the case. In United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278
(11th Cir. 1983), the defendant, a federal judge, moved to permit televising of his
criminal trial and argued that he was entitled to televised coverage under the
public trial provision of the Sixth Amendment. Judge Hastings "favor[ed] televis-
ing of his trial so that his reputation [could] be restored." Id. at 1279 n.6. Denial
of his motion was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit.
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The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of televised coverage
of a criminal trial in Estes v. Texas." s In Estes, the Court reviewed
the much publicized trial and conviction of Billie Sol Estes for swin-
dling. The Supreme Court held that the televising and broadcasting
of the trial over the defendant's objection created the probability of
prejudice to the accused and, therefore, violated his fundamental right
to a fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The result in Estes would seem, at first blush, to assert the fair
trial rights of the accused over the communitarian function of his trial,
in which the public had taken great interest. The Court, indeed, re-
viewed a seemingly overwhelming array of ways in which televising of
the trial might create unfairness for the defendant. As summarized
by the syllabus to the opinion:
There are numerous respects in which televising court proceedings may alone,
and in combination almost certainly will, cause unfairness, such as: (1) im-
properly influencing jurors by emphasizing the notoriety of the trial and af-
fecting their impartial judgment, distracting their attention, facilitating (in
States which do not sequester jurors) their viewing of selected parts of the
proceedings, and improperly influencing potential jurors and thus jeopardiz-
ing the fairness of new trials; (2) impairing the testimony of witnesses, as by
causing some to be frightened and others to overstate their testimony, and
generally influencing the testimony of witnesses, thus frustrating invocation
of the "rule" against witnesses; (3) distracting judges generally and exercising
an adverse psychological effect particularly upon those who are elected; and
(4) imposing pressure upon the defendant and intruding into the confidential
attorney-client relationship.1 19
The Court decried the power of the television camera to "destroy an
accused and his case in the eyes of the public."120
Chief Justice Warren, in his concurring opinion, argued specifically
"that the criminal trial has one well-defined purpose-to provide a fair
and reliable determination of guilt."121 He eschewed any other func-
tion of the criminal trial, especially its ritual function:
The decision below affirming petitioner's conviction runs counter to the
evolution of Anglo-American criminal procedure over a period of centuries.
During that time the criminal trial has developed from a ritual practically
devoid of rational justification to a fact-finding process, the acknowledged pur-
pose of which is to provide a fair and reliable determination of guilt.
122
Thus, one might conclude that the Court in this context gave no con-
sideration to the criminal jury trial's communitarian function.
Closer examination of Estes v. Texas, and Chief Justice Warren's
concurring opinion in particular, suggests, however, that the Court
118. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
119. Id. at 533.
120. Id. at 549.
121. Id. at 565.
122. Id. at 557.
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did not so much reject the communitarian function of criminal jury
trials, as it reached the conclusion that televising of trials is contrary
to their proper communitarian function. Televising of trials was re-
jected by Estes not solely because it was believed to impair the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial, but also because it was believed to
communicate to the public the wrong message about the nature of
court proceedings.
Chief Justice Warren concluded his opinion stating "that it violates
the Sixth Amendment for federal courts and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment for state courts to allow criminal trials to be televised to the pub-
lic at large" not only because of its potential for prejudice to the
defendant, but because "it gives the public the wrong impression
about the purpose of trials, thereby detracting from the dignity of
court proceedings and lessening the reliability of trials."123 He argued
that "Etlhe sense of fairness, dignity and integrity that all associate
with the courtroom would become lost with its commercialization" and
posed the question: "Can we be sure that the public would not inher-
ently distrust our system of justice because of its intimate association
with a commercial enterprise?1 24
Chief Justice Warren also argued explicitly against the educational
aspect of the communitarian function, but for the same reason-that a
conscious attempt to use the trial for educational purposes would sub-
vert its ritual function of fostering public confidence in the administra-
tion of justice:
It is argued that television not only entertains but also educates the public.
But the function of a trial is not to provide an educational experience; and
there is a serious danger that any attempt to use a trial as an educational tool
will both divert it from its proper purpose and lead to suspicions concerning
the integrity of the trial process.12 5
It was not that trial by jury had no communitarian purpose, but
rather, Warren believed, that it failed to serve its communitarian pur-
pose when used as an educational tool. Thus, it was held that televi-
sion coverage served to subvert rather than support the function of the
public jury trial in establishing community confidence in the fair ad-
ministration of justice.
Estes, decided like Swain in 1965, was effectively overruled 15
years later in Chandler v. Florida.126 Chandler interpreted Estes as
"not announc[ing] a constitutional rule that all photographic or broad-
123. Id. at 565.
124. Id. at 574.
125. Id. at 575. In support of this argument, Chief Justice Warren conjured up the
image of the Soviet trial of American U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers. By using
the trial to provide "an object lesson to the public," Warren argued, the Soviets
"undercut confidence in the guilt-determining aspect of the procedure and by so
doing rendered the educational aspect self-defeating."
126. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
1995]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
cast coverage of criminal trials is inherently a denial of due process"
and declined to promulgate such a rule.127 The Court held that the
Constitution does not prohibit states from experimenting with tele-
vised coverage of criminal trials.128
In reaching that result, the Court noted, first of all, that there had
been no showing of actual prejudice from the televising of trials. Sec-
ondly, the Court noted that advances in technology since Estes made
television equipment less obtrusive. As pointed out by Justice Stew-
art in his concurrence, however, there was no demonstration of actual
prejudice in Estes, and the television equipment was found there to be
unobtrusive.12 9
The Court's switch on its view of television coverage may be ex-
plained in part by a differing view as to the prejudicial impact on the
defendant. The Court noted in Chandler that no one had demon-
strated empirically what the Court had assumed in Estes-that televi-
sion necessarily has an adverse effect on due process to the defendant.
However, the potentially detrimental effects on jurors, witnesses and
judges noted by Estes remain essentially undiminished.
What must be weighed against the burden on the accused, who
seeks to exclude television coverage of her trial, is the value of televi-
sion coverage for augmenting the communitarian function of the crim-
inal trial. As noted in Chandler, the Florida practice it reviewed was
justified by reference to the educational and ritual aspects of the com-
munitarian function:
127. Because there were four dissenters in Estes, the Court in Chandler looked to Jus-
tice Harlan's concurring opinion to define the scope of the Court's holding. The
Court reached the conclusion that Estes did not announce a per se rule against
television coverage based on some equivocal language in Justice Harlan's opin-
ion-" 'At the present juncture I can only conclude that televised trials, at least in
cases like this one.. . .'" Id. at 573 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 596
(1965)). Justice Stewart, concurring in Chandler, expressed the view that the
Court was overruling Estes:
The Court in Estes found the admittedly unobtrusive presence of televi-
sion cameras in a criminal trial to be inherently prejudicial, and thus
violative of due process of law. Today the Court reaches precisely the
opposite conclusion. I have no trouble in agreeing with the Court today,
but I would acknowledge our square departure from precedent.
Id. at 586.
128. Most states now allow televised coverage in trial courtrooms. See Laura Duncan,
Group Renews Bid for Televised Trials, Cm. DAILY L. BULL., June 23, 1994, at 1
(only nine states bar televised coverage of trials). After a 3 1/2 year experiment
that allowed televising of some federal civil proceedings in selected areas, the
U.S. Judicial Conference, the policy-making body of the federal judiciary, voted
against proposals to allow television coverage of federal civil and criminal trials.
Junda Woo, Legal Beat Column, WAi.L ST. J., Sept. 22, 1994, at B8. See also
Saundra Torry, In Some Courtrooms, Check Those Cameras at the Door, WASH.
PoST, Oct. 23, 1995, at F07.
129. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 583-84 (1981).
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The Florida court was of the view that because of the significant effect of the
courts on the day-to-day lives of the citizenry, it was essential that the people
have confidence in the process. It felt that broadcast coverage of trials would
contribute to wider public acceptance and understanding of decisions. 130
Indeed, if one gives any credence to the extensive sources of potential
prejudice to the defendant cataloged by the Court in Estes, substantial
weight must be given to the communitarian function to justify televi-
sion cameras in the courtroom.13 '
The Court's switch from Estes to Chandler can only be explained by
a shift from the view expressed by Chief Justice Warren that the crim-
inal trial's sole purpose is reliable determination of guilt and/or a
changed view of the communitarian value of television coverage.
What is clear is that, in the absence of demonstrable prejudice from
the television coverage, which will be exceedingly hard to demon-
strate, the states are free to allow television coverage. This remains
the case despite a defendant's objection, and despite the resulting bur-
dens on the fair trial rights of the accused set forth in Estes. As in the
case of the requirement of prosecutorial consent to jury waiver and the
limitation of defendants' use of peremptory challenges, that result can
only be rationalized by giving constitutional weight to the communi-
tarian function of the criminal jury trial.
For the same reasons that pertain in the case of jury waiver, a pre-
sumption should be exercised in favor of a defendant's motion to pre-
clude television coverage. As in the case of the right to jury trial itself,
the right to public trial is set forth in the Sixth Amendment as a right
of the accused and as a safeguard against the exercise of arbitrary
power by the government. Similar to jury waiver, there is no reason to
doubt that the defendant who seeks to preclude television coverage is
genuinely motivated by fear of resulting bias.132 And finally, if televi-
sion coverage results in bias to the defendant of the kind described in
Estes, the communitarian justification for television coverage is com-
promised. A defendant's motion to preclude television coverage
should, therefore, be granted in the absence of a clear showing that it
will not result in prejudice.
VI. CONCLUSION
In each of the three circumstances examined-where a defendant
seeks to waive her right to a jury, to exercise peremptory strikes to
130. Id. at 565-66.
131. The Court has consistently held that the public and the media have no rights to
insist upon a public trial. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-81
(1979).
132. The operation of this principle is, however, significantly weaker than in the case
of jury waiver, since television coverage, unlike trial by jury, does not normally
provide any particular advantage to the defendant.
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eliminate a cognizable group of jurors, or to prevent televising of her
trial-the defendant seeks to avoid bias which, though palpable, will
be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate. Defendants
who are victims of majoritarian bias (because of their minority race or
because they have espoused unpopular beliefs or for some other rea-
son) may be particularly in need of the protection sought in each in-
stance. Defendants who seek these protections can be presumed to do
so out of a genuine perception of bias. To assume otherwise would be
to assume that the defendant is acting against her penal interest.
This is particularly true in the case of a defendant who seeks to waive
her jury trial rights altogether and submit her fate to a single judge.
In each circumstance, however, granting the request of the defend-
ant will limit if not quash the communitarian function of the criminal
jury in promoting community participation, education and ritual affir-
mation. In the case of waiver, the jury is eliminated altogether.
Where television coverage is precluded despite public interest that
would support it, an opportunity for larger community involvement is
cut off. And if the defendant is allowed to exercise peremptories to
strike a cognizable group of jurors, the social myth or goal of freedom
from group bias is impaired.
There is, therefore, conflict between the rights of the accused and
the communitarian function inherent in each of these circumstances.
As demonstrated above, the Court has largely ignored that conflict,
primarily by engaging in legal fictions. In the case of prosecutorial
veto over the defendant's jury waiver, the Court has relied on the fic-
tion of the neutral prosecutor. In the case of the defendant's exercise
of peremptory strikes, the Court has treated the criminal defendant as
a state actor when exercising peremptories, and it has accordingly re-
lied on the illegality of discrimination by the state to obviate the need
to balance the communitarian function and the participation rights of
jurors against the rights of the accused. In the case of the televising of
trials, the Court has ignored its own findings in Estes, partly through
reference to technological advance and despite the fact that Estes
found that the technology at issue was unobtrusive.
In each case, an implicit balance has been struck in favor of the
communitarian function and against the rights of the accused. This is
true despite the fact that the Sixth Amendment establishes public
jury trial in criminal cases as a right of the accused and despite the
fact that the interest of the community in public criminal jury trials is
never articulated in the Constitution.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution does provide, however,
without reference to the rights of the accused, that "[t]he trial of all
crimes except in cases of impeachment shall be by jury .... " Though
the Court, in Patton, concluded that this provision must be read to-
gether with the Sixth Amendment as conferring a right upon the ac-
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cused, it nonetheless provides a constitutional basis for trial by jury
independent of the rights of the accused or the reliable determination
of guilt or innocence. Though never relied on in this vein, Article III,
Section 2 gives some justification, therefore, for the constitutional
value implicitly accorded in decisions of the Court to the communitar-
ian function of the criminal jury trial.
Nonetheless, where this inchoate community interest clashes with
the legitimate attempts of the accused to avoid majoritarian bias, a
presumption should be exercised in favor of the rights of the accused.
First of all, despite the genuine community interest in public criminal
trial by jury and the general provisions of Article III, Section 2 that
give a constitutional foundation to that interest, the specific provisions
of the Sixth Amendment, firmly tied to protection of the fair trial
rights of the accused, should prevail where individual and community
interests appear to clash. As a corollary, while the bias that the ac-
cused seeks to avoid may be difficult to demonstrate, the "public confi-
dence" that the communitarian function seeks to instill is particularly
amorphous and prone to changing perceptions. 133
Secondly, analysis of the right to public jury trial in the modem
democratic context reinforces that conclusion. While the right of the
criminally accused to public trial by jury was historically constructed
as a barrier against the arbitrary power of the government (and the
monarch in particular), the danger to the accused in modem demo-
cratic society may as likely come from majoritarian bias in the jury
pool as from the court. Indeed, one of the primary functions of the
independent judiciary in our democratic government is to protect the
individual against the majoritarian bias of the community.
Finally, the legitimate attempts of a defendant to protect against
majoritarian bias should prevail against the interests of the commu-
nity where there is a perceived conflict because the communitarian
function is itself compromised when it is asserted to burden the fair
trial rights of the accused. An important aspect of the conmunitarian
function is its utility in maintaining community faith in the adminis-
tration of justice. If the insistence on trial by jury or television cover-
age or limitations on the use of peremptory challenges, to take the
examples focused on here, while promoting community participation
also result in biased proceedings, the communitarian function will be
severely compromised. The public faith and confidence that it would
instill will ultimately suffer rather than flourish.
Therefore, the request of a defendant for protection from
majoritarian bias-by waiving her jury and being tried by the court,
by exercising peremptory challenges to secure minority representation
133. As noted above, "public confidence" has been argued on both sides of the peremp-
tory challenge issue.
1995] 841
842 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:804
on her jury, or by avoiding the majority pressures created by television
coverage-should normally be honored absent the government's abil-
ity to demonstrate that there is no genuine danger of bias or the de-
fendant is making her request for some ulterior purpose. Only when
the accused's rights to an impartial trial are jealously guarded can the
values of the criminal jury's communitarian function be truly realized.
